3rd Lecture 2016 »Our own Styl«
We need to find our own “style” to produce an Existential Notation and therewith – step by step – the sum of our being; of our movements, thoughts and experiences as a structural net of recursive iterations. It is not possible to produce an Existential Notation (that means to build it from the given particles, i.e. from formatives) by copying the “style” of someone else.
According to Merleau-Ponty “style” is given with the act of speaking a language as if we would do it for the first time (or for the last time). To do so we have to find the rule (i.e. the grammatical order), with which way our speaking can always be renewed.
Then an artwork will be valuable and popular if it has reached the highest level of uniqueness of the style in correlation to history. Such an artwork is nothing but a symbol for the possibility that everyone of us may be kept in his own history. We just have to do it...
After 35.000 years of development of art – ascending from their smallest particles back to theirs smallest particles and the infinite recombination of those – there still remains the one question: How to create an Existential Notation? To answer this, we have to go back to the beginning of the question (in a sense of a systematization of how to ask), nearly 450 years back, to Paolo Lomazzos »Trattato dell'arte della Pittura«, published 1584 in Milano, translated fifteen years later by Richard Haydocke (1570 – 1642), London.
Gian Paolo Lomazzo (26 April 1538 – 27 January 1592; his first name is sometimes also given as "Giovan" or "Giovanni") was an Italian painter, best remembered for his writings on art theory , belonging to the second generation that produced Mannerism in Italian art and architecture.
Paolo Lomazzo, Trattao dell’arte della Pittura, Milano 1584, translated by Richard Haydocke (1570 - 1642)
The Division of the Work
(1.1) There is a two-fold proceeding in all arts and sciences: The one is called the order of nature, and the other of teaching. Nature proceeded ordinarily, beginning with the imperfect, as the particulars, and ending with the perfect, as the universals.
(1.2) Now if in searching out the nature of things, our understanding shall proceed after that order, by which they are brought forth by nature, doubtless it will be the most absolute and ready method that can be imagined.
(1.3) For we begin to know things by their first and immediate principles, which are well known unto us, not by mere idea, as separated from the particulars – (as some think) nor by bare imagination, as if they were seated only in our understanding (as others would have it) but as they do actually occur to the forming of the particulars which are subject to our sense, and may be pointed at with our finger.
(1.4) And this is the most certain way of knowing, amongst all the rest: It is evident then that our understanding beginning his operations from the particular, beginneth to know them by their matter and form which are their first and immediate principles, being neither really abstracted from the particulars, not yet by mere conceit placed in our understanding, as in a subject, but do actually occur to the making of a compound.
(1.5) SupposePeter or John: and may be sensible demonstrated to be in Peter or John; then the which what proof can be more evident? being drawn from the things before our eyes.
(1.6) And this is not only my opinion but Aristotle also, who wrote, that the first principles may be proved by sense: meaning that the sensible proof is more certain than the intellectual; whence a thing may then be said to be known by nature, when it is of such a nature, that it may be seen and perceived by the other senses.
(1.7) And this is the reason why Aristotle in the beginning of his Physics said; that the particulars may be known by their own nature: all which if we could comprehend within our understanding, we should be most wise: but it is impossible, that whereas they are infinite in possibility, they should be comprehended of that which is finite in act.
(1.8) Wherefore although some heavenly creature, perchance, may be capable of the understanding of all those particulars, which are actually created, yet notwithstanding because there are not so many particulars actually in the world, but that there might be a greater number created, (in so much as they whole depend upon the will of God in his providence) therefore this possibility, or (to speak more plainly) all the particulars already created and made, together with those which shall be made, and brought into the world, may be known only unto God by his prescience.
(1.9) And this Aristotle in part affirmed when he said that the particulars then may be known of their own nature, meaning, perchance, to the first mover of nature, which is God.
(1.10) The particulars then may be known of their own nature: Because look how much actuality they have (as the philosophers speak) so much ability they have to know: but they have an actual being; Therefore there matter is not mere possibility, but is brought into Act, by their form, which do not rest idly in the matter, but is occupied in bringing it forth into Act.
(1.11) And look what is said of individual substance, is likewise meant of individual Accidents. It is evident therefore if we do not understand the particulars, it is not because they cannot be understood of their own nature, but by reason of our own defect: because we cannot comprehend the infinite multitude of them.
(1.12) Wherefore our understanding ought not know things by the order of nature, seeing it cannot comprehend all the particulars, which are infinite. But it must begin with the order of Teaching, whereof it is capable.
(1.13) This method then proceeding from the universals to the particulars, may easily understood of us, because our understanding is of that nature that is properly understands universals , in so much as the power of our mind is spiritual, and therefore willingly embraced universal things separated from their matter, and made (after a sort) spiritual by the help of the active understanding.
(1.14) Whereupon I proposing to handle the art of painting in this present discourse, mean to follow the order of Teaching.
(1.15) And because I might purchase, commit an absurdity, if in ripping it up to high I should begin to define unto the reader what manner of thing quality is, and how many kinds thereof thereby; to teach him what Habitus and Dispositio, what forma and figura is; and how painting by diverse confederations is comprehended under that species of Quality (which appertained rather to a Logician or a Philosopher as to a Painter).
(1.16) Therefore I (observing Horaces precept, who would not have a man begin the history of the Trojan War at the two eggs of Leda, that is, that in handling a matter he ought not to take the beginning too far of from the present matter in hand) means first to begin with the definition of painting, which is the first, most general, and immediate principle, as most properly offering itself to our confederation:
(1.17) Wherein afterwards I propose to show the true genus thereof, which is the first part of the definition, and consequently all the differences occurring to the same, for the restraining of the genus which is a species of quality called Arte, and makes the most special kind of quality called painting: And because the differences which make painting a particular and distinct Arte from all others are few: viz.
– Light & Perspective.